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Abstract 
Organizational forms such as task-oriented teams have often been proposed as a 
method to enhance the efficiency of a firm. Under asymmetric information, however, 
the costs of acquiring the information needed to improve efficiency may outweigh the 
efficiency gains and lead to lower profits. We illustrate this idea by considering a profit­
maximizing principal who needs to allocate a group of agents among a number of projects , 
given that the principal has incomplete information about the agents' abilities. We study 
feasible incentive-compatible (truth-revealing) individually rational mechanisms under 
both the dominant strategy and Bayesian Nash behavioral assumptions. Some attention 
is also paid to Nash equilibrium mechanisms. The paper covers derivation of optimal 
mechanisms, efficiency analysis, and analysis of the principal's expected profit as a func­
tion of different types of environment and information structures. We find that if the 
principal has little or no information about the agents' private characteristics and the 
agents follow dominant strategy behavior, the principal may often run into losses in an 
attempt to discover the hidden information. Paradoxically, the loss occurs when the effi­
ciency gains from team production are high and the competition among the agents is low. 
If the hidden information about each agent can be summarized as a one-dimensional type 
parameter, and if a prior distribution function of the agents '  types is common knowledge 
among the agents and the principal, an expected-profit maximizing Bayesian equilibrium 
mechanism exists and is of the optimal auction form (Myerson, 1981 ) .  Moreover, the 
mechanism can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies with no expected 
profit loss for the principal. Yet, the principal 's profit often decreases with an increase in 
the number of projects. These findings suggest that, in profit-maximizing firms with low 
competition among the employees, efficient organizational forms may often be foregone 
in favor of profits. 
The Formation of Multiple Teams 
Katerina Sherstyuk* 
1 Introduction
The notion of a good organization as a robustly structured hierarchical unity has been 
recently changing in favor of the idea of more flexible organizational forms. With the 
growing diversity and complexity of tasks faced by a firm, one may expect high efficiency 
gains from the more flexible and responsive organizational structures. In particular, the 
notion of a "virtual corporation," which can be thought of as a flexible task-oriented part­
nership, has become quite popular in the literature (Byrne, Brandt, Port ( 1993) ) .  One 
might ask whether flexible organizations should necessarily take the form of parterships, 
or whether owners of private firms can also gain from internal organizational flexibility. 
To answer this, one needs to consider the possible implications of flexible organizational 
forms, both for production efficiency and for owners' profit, as well as the informational 
requirements imposed on the management by the organization structure. In this study, 
we address the above question in the principal-agent framework and focus on one specific 
problem that a principal is likely to face in a flexible multi-project organization - the 
problem of forming temporary task-oriented teams from a given set of agents. Assuming 
the principal has incomplete information about the agents' characteristics, we consider 
whether she can gain from teams-based production. Curiously, we learn that rather of­
ten, when the potential efficiency gains from flexible organizations are high, it becomes 
too costly for the principal to run such organizations. 
We consider an . .acl.verse .selection model with.a-J*'�ncipal-who·fias a-number of (possibly 
profitable for her) projects to carry out and needs to hire the agents to work on these 
projects - each person for at most one project - from a given group of people. Each agent 
is characterized by his preference over working on projects (which might represent his 
personal taste and/or the difficulty of each job for him),  and each subgroup of agents - by 
*I would like to thank John Ledyard, Tom Palfrey and Kim Border for their help. I also benefited
from discussions with John Duggan and Charles Noussair. All errors are my own. 
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its productivity of working on each project . The principal needs to choose an allocation 
of the agents among projects that would maximize the principal's profit , which is the 
share of the revenue from all the projects net of the payments to the agents necessary to 
induce them to behave in the principal's interest. A difficulty arises when the principal 
does not have complete information about the agents' characteristics and hence cannot 
impose her most preferred outcome without the costly creation of the "right" incentives 
for the agents. 
The recent literature in the economics of incomplete information pays a lot of attention 
to both the issue of inducing the "right" incentives for agents working in teams (Groves 
(1973) , Holmstrom (1982) ,  McAfee and McMillan ( 1991 ) ) ,  and the one of choosing the 
right agent for a job (Laffont and Tirole (1987) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) ) .  Both 
the moral hazard and the adverse selection aspects of the problem have been studied. 
Yet, the problem of optimally selecting teams for a given set of projects has been hardly 
addressed. Bolle's "Team Selection" paper (1991 )  is a rare study that addresses the issue 
of team formation in the Nash equilibrium framework with complete information.  In 
our study, we use Bolle's approach to model the team production process, but consider 
incomplete information environments and seek to find optimal incentive-compatible team 
selection mechanisms under various behavioral assumptions. We use a simple model of 
team production where the moral hazard problem is absent. The social surplus pro­
duced by a team of agents on a project is a deterministic function of the agents' joint. 
productivity parameter, which is assumed to be common knowledge, and the agents' 
private characteristics, or cost types. The agents' private characteristics are assumed to 
be independent. 
We mainly focus on two information structures and two behavioral assumptions. In 
section 2 we assume a "complete ignorance" information structure, where there is no 
well-defined probability assessment over the agents' (possibly multi-dimensional) private 
characteristics that is common knowledge among the agents and the principal. There­
fore, the agents are assumed to follow dominant strategy behavior. We consider feasible 
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and individually rational (IR) mecha­
nisms. Under these assumptions, the social efficiency maximizing information revelation 
mechanisms have been broadly studied in the literature, and truth is found to be a domi­
nant strategy if and only if the mechanism is Groves-Clark (Groves ( 1973) ,  Clark (1971 ) ,  
Green and Laffont (1977) ) .  However, it is generically not budget-balancing (Green and 
Laffont ( 1977) , Walker (1980) ) ,  and hence the "social planner" (the principal) may run 
into losses. The inconsistency of efficiency maximization with the principal 's profit max­
imization is recognized by a number of authors (Groves and Loeb ( 1975 , 1979) , J. Miller 
and P. Murrell (1981 ) ,  G .  Miller (1992) ) ,  but the problem of profit-maximization con­
strained by dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the 
agents has not been explicitly studied. We address this problem and find that under 
the "complete ignorance" assumption, there does not exist a uniform strongly optimal 
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mechanism for a principal - a mechanism that in any environment1 produces a higher
level of profit than any other DSIC IR mechanism. The mechanisms that are optimal 
under an alternative, weaker criterion of optimality (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972) exist, but 
they can be "ad hoc," very inefficient and hardly sensitive to the environment. Among 
the efficiency maximizing mechanisms, any DSIC mechanism that is individually rational 
for the agents is not individually rational for the principal . The result indicates that, in 
contrast to the efficiency-maximization case, in generic environments a principal cannot 
successfully organize production· without having substantial information about agents' 
characteristics. 
We further analyze specific types of environments that can be of interest and find 
that the more competitive the environment is, the higher the principal's profit is. In 
this part, our results are very similar to Makowski and Ostroy (1987) , who establish a 
close connection between perfect competition and efficient dominant strategy incentive 
compatible mechanisms. We find that in the perfectly competitive environments, where 
each agent is dispensable, the principal can use efficient DSIC mechanism to acquire the 
whole social surplus for herself. On the other hand, perhaps surprisingly, we establish 
that the higher the social gains from the teams' production are, the lower is the principal 's 
profit. Thus, pursuing efficiency gains from a flexible organization form appears to be 
completely at odds with the principal's self-interest. 
In section 3 we move to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium framework, where the infor­
mation incompleteness on the principal's part is less extreme. The full consideration 
of this problem would require us to address a multi-dimensional adverse selection issue, 
allowing agents' costs to be independent (or stochastically correlated) across project . 
While a number of recent studies approach the latter problem (Rochet ( 1985) , McAfee 
and McMillan (1988) , Wilson ( 1993) ,  Armstrong (1993a, 1993b) ) ,  all of them indicate 
that explicit characteristics of the solutions are difficult to obtain even for a single-agent 
case. In characterizing incentive-compatible mechanisms in a multi-dimensional setting, 
McAfee and McMillan (1988) derive a generalized single-crossing property which requires, 
essentially, the agents' types to line up. In this study, we reduce the problem to a one­
dimensional case by assuming that agents' costs on different projects are deterministic 
functions of one-dimensional types. The types' probability distribution is known to the 
principal and the agents. Both the principal and agents are risk-neutral. Under these 
assumptions, we derive Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) IR mechanisms that maxi­
mize the principal 's expected profit, and present necessary and sufficient conditions for 
such mechanisms to exist . We show that an optimal BIC IR mechanism is similar to an 
optimal auction with risk-neutrality and independent private values a la Myerson ( 1981) . 
Furthermore, following a technique presented by Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) , we 
show that an optimal mechanism can be equivalently implemented in dominant strate-
1 By an environment we mean the teams' productivity parameters and the agents' private cost 
characteristics. 
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gies with no expected profit loss to the principal. In this way, the problem of finding an 
optimal DSIC IR mechanism is resolved for this type of information structure. However, 
we find that the larger the number of projects, i .e. , the more complicated the alloca­
tion problem is, the stronger the restrictions are on the mechanism needed to satisfy the 
agents' incentive compatibility. The principal is often bound to treat agents of different 
types alike and hence faces losses in her expected profits. 
In section 4 we briefly explore the levels of profit achievable by the principal if she is
"completely ignorant" (as in section 2) , but the agents have complete information about 
each other's characteristics and follow Nash equilibrium behavior. We present our main 
conclusions and discuss their implications for issues about flexible organizational forms 
in section 5. Section 6 contains proofs of the propositions. 
2 Dominant strategy mechanisms with "complete
ignorance" 
2 .1 The model 
Consider a simple case of the multiple team formation problem with pure adverse se­
lection, where nature-induced uncertainty and moral hazard are absent. We are given 
the set of agents N = { 1 ,  . .  n }, n 2::: 1 ,  and the set of projects K = { 1 , .. , k }, k 2::: 1 ,  
among which the agents are to be allocated. Each agent i is characterized by a vector of 
costs ( disutility levels) ci = { Cij} ,  with each Cij denoting i 's disutility of being assigned
to the project j. For every i ,  let Ci E Ci , where Ci is a convex bounded subset of Rk
with a non-empty interior. We may interpret these disutilities as exogenously given costs 
of an agent's effort which vary depending on the project to which he is assigned. Let 
C = (c1, . .  , en) denote the matrix of all agents' costs, and C_i - the matrix of costs of
agents other than i , for every i E N. Then let C = xiCi denote the set of all possible
disutility profiles. Assume that the costs Cij are expressed in monetary terms and are the
private information of each respective agent. 
A team of agents T � N assigned to a project j E K is represented by an n­
dimensional vector Xj = (x1j , . .  , Xnj ) ,  where for all i E N Xij = 1 if agent i is assigned
to the project j ,  and Xij = 0 otherwise. Then.an n x .km.atrixX = (x 11 .. , xk ) denotes
a particular allocation, or assignment, of agents across the projects . An allocation X is 
feasible if for all i E N, 'L.jEK Xij � 1 and for all i E N, j E K, Xij E {O, 1 }2. Let X
denote the set of all feasible allocations. 
2 Alternatively, we could assume that an agent's contribution can be distributed among several projects
and, therefore, Xii is a continuous variable, Xii E (0, 1]. Most of the results presented in this paper are
still valid in the continuous case. We will indicate which parts of the analysis hold for X;j E { 0, 1 }  case
only. 
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Suppose each team xi, Xij E { 0, 1} for all i E N is characterized by its potential
productivity on a project j, Fj (Xj) ,  JFj (Xj ) J < oo, expressed in monetary terms. Assume
Fj (O, . . , 0) = 0 for all j. For each Xj and each j E K, let .Fj(Xj) C R be the set of all
possible productivity parameters. Assume that the projects have no external productivity 
effects on each other, and that each agent can be assigned to at most one project. Then 
for any feasible allocation X of agents among the projects, the total gross productivity
of the allocation equals the sum of the teams' productivities over projects: 
F(X) = L Fj (Xj) . 
jEK 
Note that F(O) = 0. For future convenience, for every agent i E N, let Xi denote a
k-dimensional vector of i's assignment, and X_i - a matrix of allocations of agents other 
than i. Let .F c xx Ex x jEK .Fj (Xj ) c Rk denote the set of all possible productivity
profiles. 
We denote an environment as (F, C), a set of parameters characterizing the teams'
productivities and the agents' private costs on each project. Let (.F, C) denote the set of
possible environments. 
Given an environment (F, C), the net productivity, or the social surplus, of a feasible
allocation X equals the difference between the gross productivity and the agents' costs:
n k 
S(X) = F(X) - L L  CijXij . 
i=l j=l 
( 1 )  
A feasible allocation X* E X is called efficient if it maximizes the social surplus
among all the feasible allocations. We assume that (.F, C) is such that for every F E .F 
there exist C, C' E C such that S(X; C) < 0 for every X E X \ 0 and S(X; C') > 0
for some X E X, i .e . , there exist environments where production is efficient and other
environments where the only efficient allocative option is "no production" X = 0 .  
Assume that the teams' productivities on each project are common knowledge, whereas 
the agents' costs are the agents' private information3. Suppose that the principal has 
no specific probability assessment about the distributions of the agents' costs and as­
sumes that the agents have no common priors . Therefore, the principal is restricted to 
consideration of dominant strategy mechanisms4. 
3 Almost equivalently, ..we can assume.that the team productiv.ities-e�-ar€Bnly-known to members 
of the teams, but the output of each team is ex-post observable. Then, with no uncertainty involved, a 
simple forcing contract (as in Holmstrom ( 1982)) could enforce truthful revelation of productivities as a 
Nash equilibrium. A coordination problem, however, prevents making the truthful productivity reports 
dominant strategies. 
4If the principal were uninformed about the distribution of the agents' costs but the distribution was 
the common knowledge among the agents, there might exist extended revelation mechanisms in which 
the agents first report their common priors to the principal, and then the actual costs are revealed. In 
this case Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms could be considered by the principal. 
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The principal 's problem is to offer the agents an allocation rule X ( ·) and a menu of
wages W(·) ,  with Wij denoting the wage paid to agent i if he is employed on the project
j ,  so that it will be always in the agents' self-interest to submit to the principal the infor­
mation which will allow the latter to choose her most desirable allocation, i .e., dominant 
strategy incentive compatibility will be sustained. The principal seeks to maximize her 
profit, defined as her share of surplus net of the payments to the agents, which is 
n k 
7r(X) = F(X) - L L  WijXij . 
i=l j=l 
(2) 
Suppose that the agents are indifferent to the outcome of production per se and care 
only about their own costs and wages. Specifically, we assume each agent is characterized 
by a quasi-linear utility function 
k 
ui (Xi , wi ; ci) = L(Wij - Cij )Xij . 
j=l 
(3) 
Thus, each agent is maximizing his payoff from employment, which, given his assignment, 
equals the difference between his wage and cost. 
By the revelation principle (Dagusta, Hammond and Maskin ( 1979) ) ,  without loss
of generality, we can restrict our attention to direct revelation mechanisms, where the 
agents report their cost vectors to the principal . For each i E N, let ci denote the reported
costs as opposed to the true costs ci. Given the reported costs 6, the principal chooses
allocation and wage matrices according to a prespecified rule g(C) = (X(C) , W(C) )5. 
The principal's task, then, is to choose a dominant strategy incentive compatible decision 
rule g ( C) that will maximize her objective function 2. We also assume that the agents
cannot be forced to participate in the project, and have a reservation utility level of 0 
if they do not participate. Hence the principal has to observe the individual rationality 
constraints for every agent to be able to employ him. Given the above assumptions, we 
can present the principal's problem as follows: 
n k 
rpax _ F(X(C) )  - L L  Wij (C)xij (C) 
X(C),W(C) i=l j=l 
subject to: 
Xij (C) E {O, 1 } for any i E N, j E K
(4) 
(5) 
5Since the productivity environment Fis observable to the principal, the rule may and will, in general, 
depend on Fas well as C: g = gp(C) . The dependence of mechanisms on the observable elements of 
the environment is omitted, where possible. to simplify exposition. 
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k 
L Xij (C) :::; 1 for every i E N
j=l 
k k 
l:(wij (C-i , Ci) - Cij )Xij (C-i, ci) 2: l:(wij (C) - Cij)Xij (C) 
j=l j=l 
for every i E N, any ci , any C 
k 
l:(wij (C- i, ci ) � Cij)Xij (C-i , ci) 2: 0 
j=l 




In the above formulation, 5 and 6 are feasibility constraints ,  7 is the incentive com­
patibility constraint which guarantees that each agent cannot gain from a non-truthful 
report no matter what the others' reports are, and 8 is the individual rationality, or the 
voluntary participation, constraint . 
The problem would be a variant of a traditional resource allocation problem if the 
principal were a social surplus (expression 1) maximizer; it becomes quite different when
the principal's objective function is to maximize her own share of surplus (expression 
2). Below, we consider the mechanisms that are feasible and optimal for a self-interested 
principal under various productivity-cost environments. 
2.2 Complete info rmation solution 
We start with the compete information solution. Consider the payoff that would be avail­
able to the principal under complete information (principal's first best). If each agent's 
type were observable to the principal, she would choose the allocation and payment 
schedule (X*, W*) such that
n k 
{X*} maximizes F(X) - L L  CijXij , 
i=l j=l 
w;j = Cijxij for all i E N, j E K .
(9) 
( 10) 
Thus, under complete information, the principal chooses an efficient allocation - one 
that maximizes the social surplus. Each employed agent is compensated for the cost he 
bears at the project he is assigned to, and hence the individual rationality constraint is 
satisfied. However, the agents get a zero share of the social surplus, which goes exclusively 
to the principal. Note also that none of the agents can gain from changing his assignment 
to a different project under the suggested payment scheme since he does not get any 
compensation for his costs elsewhere. 
7 
In what follows, we compare the principal 's payoffs under "complete ignorance" to her 
first best payoff and determine the information rents that the agents are able to extract 
from the principal. 
2.3 The principal 's choice of mechanisms under complete ig­
norance 
We begin our consideration with the direct revelation dominant strategy incentive 
compatible (DSIC) individually rational (IR) mechanisms that are not environment­
specific. Suppose the principal ex-ante has no well-defined beliefs about the distribution 
of the agents' costs, except, perhaps, it is known that each particular C E  C occurs with
probability zero. We will call this a "complete ignorance" situation ,  keeping in mind the 
inaccuracy of the term. A number of possible optimality criteria can be used for compar­
ison of various dominant strategy mechanisms under complete ignorance. For a broad 
class of problems with a social surplus maximizing principal, it has been shown (Groves
(1973), Green and Laffont (1977) , Walker (1980) )  that there are DSIC mechanisms that 
are ex-post efficient even under the complete ignorance assumption. For any environ­
ment, they guarantee a level of social surplus no less than any other DSIC mechanisms. 
In the analogy with the efficiency-maximization case, we first consider the strongest pos­
sible criterion of optimality for a self-interested principal - ex-post profitability. We then
discuss an alternative - and much weaker - optimality criterion. 
Given the agents' cost reports C, let (F, C) denote the reported environment. 
Definition 1 Within the class of direct revelation DSIC IR mechanisms, a mechanism 
g (C) = (X(C) , W(C))6 is called strongly optimal if for any other DSIC IR mechanism 
g(C) = (X(C) , W(C)) , for every environment (F, C) 
7r (g ( C)) � 7r(g ( C)) . 
The following proposition shows that this optimality criterion is too strong a require­
ment for any incomplete information structure. 
Proposition 1 if a -principal has incomplete information about the environment, there 
does not exist a strongly optimal DSIC IR mechanism. 
We prove the above statement with the help of several lemmas7• 
6Hereafter, we will denote DSIC mechanisms by g(C) instead of g(C) so as to not cause confusion. 
7The proofs for the statements, if not presented in the text, are given in section 6. 
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Lemma 1 A DSIC IR mechanism is strongly optimal only if in any environment it 
guarantees the first best, i. e. , the complete information level of profit to the principal. 
Corollary 1 A mechanism G ( F, C) is strongly optimal only if it is social surplus maxi­
mizing. 
Therefore, we need to consider a class of DSIC mechanisms that maximize social ef­
ficiency. For this class of mechanisms, Green and Laffont (1977) have shown that the 
only truth-dominant direct revelation mechanisms are Groves mechanisms, and, more­
over, these mechanisms are not generically budget balancing (Walker (1980) ) .  We now
define a class of Groves mechanisms corresponding to the team formation problem. 
Definition 2 A mechanism is called a Modified Groves mechanism if, given a reported 
environment (F, C) , it chooses an allocation X*(F, C) such that 
n k 
X* maximizes F(X) - L L  CijXij (11 )  
i=l j=l 
and a set of transfers W* (F, C) defined by 
L w;jx;j = F(X*) - L L  C/jXiJ (ci , c_i )  + h (C_i) ' (12) j l:;i:i j 
where h( C_i )  is an arbitrary deterministic function of the other agents' cost reports. 
Lemma 2 The Modified Groves mechanisms in the problem with observable production 
have the same properties as the standard Groves mechanisms in the allocation problem 
without production. That is, the Modified Groves mechanisms are the only DSIC efficient 
mechanisms, and they are not generically budget-balancing. 
Corollary 2 There does not exist an efficient DSIC IR mechanism which in every en-
vironment allocates the whole social surplus to the principal. • 
Proof Follows from the fact that the Groves mechanisms are generically not budget­
balancing (Walker (1980) ) .  D
Combining the results of lemmas 1 ,2 and corollaries 1 ,2  concludes the proof of propo­
sition 1 .  
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Proposition 1 shows that if a self-interested principal has no (or incomplete) infor­
mation about the agents' cost types, she cannot choose a mechanism that will perform 
better for her in any environment compared to other DSIC mechanisms. This conclusion 
contrasts with the results obtained for a social surplus maximizing principal: in the lat­
ter case, the principal ex-ante need not have any information about the agents' costs to 
implement a socially efficient outcome. The difference in the results apparently emerges 
from the fact that with social efficiency maximization there is "enough" coincidence of 
interests between the social planner and the agents; the Groves-type transfer rules com­
pensate individuals for the differences in the social and individual objective functions. 
On the contrary, with profit maximization, the principal and the agents have opposing 
interests with respect to the social surplus division, which makes the principal's first best 
not implementable in dominant strategies8• 
The above results rest heavily on the optimality criterion used and the complete igno­
rance assumption. In section 2.5 below we consider a much weaker optimality criterion 
suggested by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) for decision-making under complete ignorance; 
we find that under this criterion optimal mechanisms often exist. Then in section 3 we 
show that if the principal has a prior over the distribution of the agents' cost types, then 
the ex-ante optimal mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected profit subject to 
dominant strategy incentive compatibility is well defined. Before turning to these issues, 
however, we characterize certain suboptimal feasible mechanisms. In the next section, we 
consider efficiency-maximizing mechanisms and analyze the range of payoffs (or the share
of social surplus) that the principal can guarantee for herself under these mechanisms 
depending on the type of environment she operates in. 
2.4 Efficient dominant strategy mechanisms 
Makowski and Ostroy (1987) consider the connection between the properties of efficiency­
maximizing DSIC mechanisms and the competitive characteristics of an economy for a 
general class of incentive problems with incomplete information. They establish a direct 
connection between the DSIC property of mechanisms in a mechanism design framework 
and the notion of perfect competition in Walrasian equilibrium theory. They find that 
a perfectly competitive economy in which no individual can change equilibrium prices is 
equivalent to the special kind of DSIC IR mechanism - the marginal product mechanism 
under which each agent is rewarded with the JeveLoLutil.i.ty_exactly equal to the value of 
his marginal product, when agents' characteristics exhibit no complementarity with each 
other. Our findings presented in this section are remarkably coherent with the Makowski 
8Roberts ( 1979) presents a complete characterization of the social choice functions that are imple­
mentable in dominant strategies for the class of quasi-linear utility functions. He shows that such social 
choice functions maximize the weighted sum of individual utilities of an allocation plus a function that 
does not depend on individuals' preferences. Hence, coincidence of interests between the social choice 
function and individual preferences is a necessary condition for implementation in dominant strategies. 
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and Ostroy results, although we approach the problem from a different perspective: We 
find that the "best" profit-maximizing mechanism for the principal restricted to the use 
of ex-post efficient DSIC IR mechanisms is the marginal product mechanism, and then 
investigate under what classes of environments the principal can, using this mechanism, 
extract all the social surplus from the agents. 
Suppose the principal - for some reason - can only use DSIC mechanisms that are 
social surplus maximizing. Consider the implications of this restriction for the principal's 
profit. From the previous section we know (lemma 2) that the principal in this case is
restricted to the class of Modified Groves mechanisms. Within this class, and taking into 
account that a mechanism should satisfy individual rationality, define the principal's 
preference over mechanisms by 
Definition 3 Within the class of Modified Groves individually rational mechanisms, a 
mechanism g (C) = (X (C) , W(C)) is preferred to a mechanism g (C) = (X(C) , W(C) ) if 
for all environments (F, C) 
7r (g ( C)) � 7r(g(  C) )  . 
A mechanism is called dominant if it is preferred to every other Modified Groves IR 
mechanisms. 
Corollary 3 A Modified Groves IR mechanism g(C) = (X(C) , W(C) ) is preferred to a 
Modified Groves IR mechanism g(C) = (X(C) , W(C)) if and only if for every (F, C) 
L hi (C-i) * (L x;i ) ::; L hi (C-i) * (L x;j ) , 
iEN j iEN j
(13) 
where hi (C_i) , hi (C-i) are arbitrarily components of transfers in g (C) and g (C) , respec­
tively, as given by 12. 
In the above definition the preference relation is not strict: There may exist more 
than one dominant Modified Groves IR mechanism. What matters, however, is that all 
dominant mechanisms are ex-post profit-equivalent, i .e . ,  they provide the principal with 
an equal amount of profit for every environment. Therefore, it is sufficient to find just 
one dominant mechanism. We.now introduce.A. Modified._Grov.es .individually rational 
mechanism that satisfies the desired dominance property. 
Definition 4 A direct revelation mechanism g* (F, C) is called the Marginal Prod­
uct Wage (MPW) mechanism if, given a reported environment (F, C) , it chooses 
1 1  
(X*(F, C) , W*(F, C) )  such that 
n k 
X* maximizes F(X) - L L  CijXij ;
i=l j=l 
W* such that for each i 
* 
[ [F(.X) -* Lz#i Lj CzjX i ] - [F(X-i) - Ll#i Lj c1jitj]
W·· = if X·· = 1 lJ '.} lJ 
0 if x'!'. = 0 '.} lJ ' 
where X _i is an ( n - 1 )  x k allocation matrix that maximizes
F(X-i) - L L  CijXij = S(X-i) l#i j
( 14) 
( 15) 
Proposition 2 The Marginal Product Wage mechanism is efficient, dominant strategy 
incentive compatible and individually rational. 
It can be easily seen that the MPW mechanism pays every employed agent his "raw 
marginal product" - the net marginal product that the agent produces in the most 
efficient allocation and his cost compensation. Let S* = S(X*) denote the social surplus
produced in the efficient allocation, and §_i = S(X-i) denote the social surplus produced
in the efficient allocation without agent i. Then 
Two important properties of the mechanism (DSIC and IR) follow: first, the agents can
only gain from truthful revelation since they are rewarded with the value of the whole 
social surplus minus a lump sum transfer. Second , since only the agents who produce 
non-negative marginal social surplus are employed, each agent is guaranteed to have a 
non-negative level of utility. We also note that this mechanism is envy-free, i .e. , no agent 
could gain from changing his employment given the wages he is offered10. The next 
proposition shows that the MPW mechanism is indeed dominant. 
9It follows that each agent's utility equals the value of his (net) marginal product, and therefore 
this mechanism is indeed the Makowski-Ostroy marginal product mechanism. So proposition 2 directly 
follows from Makowski-Ostroy (1987). 
10Formally, we call a mechanism (X•(C) , w•(C)) envy-free if for every i E N, 
L(w;i -Cij)xii � L(wij-Cij)X;j
jEK jEK 
for any feasible Xi. Since under the MPW mechanism an agent, if employed on a project j, can only
gain from employment, and is offered zero wages at the projects other than j, the envy-free requirement 
is satisfied. 
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Proposition 3 The Marginal Product Wage mechanism is dominant in the class of Mod­
ified Groves individually rational mechanisms. 
Knowing that the Marginal Product Wage mechanism is "the best" for the principal 
in the class of efficient DSIC IR mechanisms, we turn to the question of how profitable 
this mechanism could be. Unfortunately, as the next proposition shows, the principal is 
not guaranteed against losses under this mechanism. 
Proposition 4 The principal cannot guarantee herself a non-negative profit for every 
environment under the Marginal Product Wage mechanism. 
Proof It is sufficient to present an example of an environment in which the principal
gets a negative payoff. Let n = 2, k = 2, Fi ({l}) = 5, F1 ({2}) = 7, F1 ({1 , 2}) = 15 ,
F2 ( {1}) = 0, F2 ( {2}) = 3, F2 ( {1 ,  2}) = 4, Cij :-- 2 for all i , j.  Then the efficient allocation
is xt1 = 1 ,  xt2 = 0, x21 = 1 ,  x22 = 0, with F(X*) = 15 .  The MPW mechanism wages are 
W11 = ( 15  - 2) - (7 - 2) = 8, W21 = ( 15 - 2) - (5 - 2) = 10,  W12 = W22 = 0 .  Then the 
principal's payoff is 7r (X*) = 15  - 8 - 10 = -3 < 0.  0 
Under specific types of environments, however, the principal is able to extract a non­
negative surplus from the agents. These are highly competitive environments, in which 
the agents' marginal contributions to the total surplus produced are "low enough." We 
now characterize these environments. 
Corollary 4 If the agents' net marginal products (S* - §_i) are "low enough" in the 
sense that the following inequality holds: 
n 
(n - l)S* ::; L §_i , 
i=l 
then the principal gets a non-negative payoff in the MPW mechanism. 
(16) 
The above conditions may correspond to different types of economic situations: in 
one type, an efficient allocation does not employ every available agent, but for many 
employed agents there are unemployed ones that closely match them in productivity and 
cost characteristics. In this case there exists a high degree of substitution among some 
agents, and an environment can be called highly competitive. The other possible situation 
is when most agents are employed but the teams' net productivities are characterized 
by "decreasing returns to scale." We start with analysis of the latter case. Consider 
an environment in which it is efficient to employ every available agent under the MPW 
mechanism. We call it a full employment environment.
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Definition 5 A full employment environment is one in which every available agent is 
employed under the MPW mechanism. Formally, given the set of agents N and any 
Nh � N, let X* (Nh) be the matrix of efficient assignments when the subset Nh of agents 
is available. Then the environment is called full employment if 
L L x;i (Nh) = INhl for all Nh � N , (17) 
iENh j 
where INhl denotes the number of elements in Nh. 
Next, we introduce the notion of decreasing returns to scale. For our model it is 
easier to define decreasing returns to scale in terms of average per person surplus (net
product) produced under the MPW mechanism. Let s* (N) = S* / (L,i Lj xii ) denote the
average per person surplus produced when all the agents are available for employment, 
and s_i = S(N-i)/ (L,1::f.i Lj Xtj ) - average per person surplus when all the agents but i
are available. Finally, let s(N-i) = (L,f=1 8-i)/n denote the average per person surplus
produced when an "average" agent is excluded from possible employment. 
Definition 6 A production environment is characterized by decreasing net returns to 
scale if an average agent, efficiently employed under MPW mechanism, decreases the av­
erage per person social surplus produced, as compared to the efficient employment without 
this agent. That is, 
(18) 
Corollary 5 If an environment is full employment and characterized by decreasing net 
returns to scale, the principal can guarantee herself a non-negative payoff under the MPW 
mechanism. 
We now turn to another type of environment which is extremely favorable to the 
principal - a perfectly competitive environment, where no agent is indispensable. In 
such environments, each agent faces the competition of at least one other agent who 
is identical to him. With a continuum of possible types of agents and independence 
of types, such environments occur with probability zero, but if the number of agents 
available for employment is large, ·there-might �xist -someagents--who closely match each 
other in productivity-costs characteristics. Then each agent's marginal contribution, 
and, consequently, his share of the social surplus will be small, therefore increasing the 
principal's share of the surplus. The analysis of the extreme, perfect competition case 
indicates that, in general, competition serves the interests of the principal. 
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Definition 7 An environment ( F, C) is called perfectly competitive if for any agent i E N
who is employed under MPW mechanism 
S(X*(F, C)) = S(X-i(F, C_i) ) 11
Proposition 5 If an environment is perfectly competitive, then under the MPW mecha­
nism the principal achieves her first best level of profit, i . e . ,  she captures the whole social 
surplus of production. 
This statement follows from the definitions of the MPW mechanism and the perfectly 
competitive environment. 
To summarize, we find that efficient dominant strategy individually rational mecha­
nisms do not always leave the principal with a non-negative profit. The environments 
in which the principal can guarantee herself a non-negative profit are rather restrictive 
and look a lot like traditional labor markets with homogeneous workers; competition 
among agents serves to the principal's advantage. On the other hand, if the agents have 
complementary characteristics and their joint production in teams produces increasing 
social surplus, the principal is doomed to run into losses. The last observation is curious 
since from a production efficiency viewpoint, the teams should be formed exactly when 
the efficiency gain from the joint production is high. Our analysis indicates, however, 
that a self-interested principal who is forced to implement efficient allocations only loses 
from high efficiency. 
2.5 An alternative optimality criterion 
The above analysis does not imply, of  course, that any DSIC IR mechanism would nec­
essarily make a self-interested principal bear losses under certain environments. It only 
shows that no-loss DSIC mechanisms cannot have socially desirable properties such as 
economic efficiency. From the profit-maximizing principal's perspective, however, effi­
ciency is not nearly as important as the profits that a mechanism produces in every 
possible environment. In section 2 .3 above we have found that there is no DSIC IR 
mechanism that is ex-post profit maximizing for all environments. With this result in 
mind, the principal may prefer any mechanism which insures her against losses and pro­
vides high profits at least in some environments. This reasoning corresponds to the 
criterion of optimality suggested by Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) for decision-making un­
der ignorance. In their terms, an action is called optimal if the minimal and maximal 
11 Makowski and Ostroy define perfect competition as a situation in which no individual can change 
equilibrium prices. They further show that this is equivalent to an environment where each agent's 
marginal product equals zero. 
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possible payoffs from this action are not lower than the respective payoffs from any other 
action. In application to our problem, this criterion implies that a mechanism is optimal 
if it always provides a non-negative profit and in the environment with minimal costs 
guarantees the principal her first best12: 
Definition 8 Within the class of direct revelation DSIC IR mechanisms, a mechanism 
g (C) = (X(C) , W(C))  is called weakly optimal if for any C E  C 
7r(g (C)) :'.'.: 0
and there exists C* E C such that for any C E C, any X E X
7r(g(C*) )  :'.'.: S(X; C) . 
From the above discussion, it immediately follows that if C is closed from below, then
a weakly optimal mechanisms exists. 
Proposition 6 Suppose that C* E C, where C* is defined by cii = inf { Cij l cii E Cii} for 
all (i , j ) E N  x K. Then there exists a weakly optimal mechanism. 
Proof Suppose that C* E C, where C* is defined as above. Consider a mechanism
g* ( C) which chooses an efficient allocation X* when C = C* is reported, and no produc­
tion X* = 0 otherwise. Let w;i = ciixij · Obviously, g* is weakly optimal. D
Unfortunately for the principal, weakly optimal mechanisms may always result in 
zero profit except for a single lowest cost environment. We now suggest an alternative 
suboptimal class of "no-loss" mechanisms which allow the possibility of positive profits 
for uncountable sets of environments. 
Consider the following direct revelation mechanism. Given the observable productivity 
parameters F(·) ,  choose an arbitrary n x m matrix of constants B, B E  C, such that
12Note that , first, there do not exist individually rational mechanisms that guarantee strictly positive 
profits in all environments, since we have assumed (section 2.1 )  that there is C E C such that for any
feasible X, S(X) � 0. For the same reason, any mechanism that gives the principal a profit higher than 
the corresponding level of the social surplus cannot be individually rational. 
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Let X*(B) denote an allocation where the maximum is achieved. Next, given the cost
reports C, form the matrix }((F, C) using the following rule:
- [ 1
Xij = Q 
if xij(B) = 1 and Cij � bij
otherwise . 
Now consider the mechanism g(C) = (X(C) , W(C) ) such that X solves
and W is defined by 
mpx(F(X) - L L bijXij )iEN jEK 
subject to: 
X is feasible ,
F(X) - L L bijXij 2:: 0
iEN jEK 
if Xij = 0 then Xij = 0 ,
if xii = 1
otherwise . 
This mechanism is DSIC, IR and never gives the principal a negative profit. For 
C* = B, the mechanism provides the principal her first-best outcome; for any C E C 
such that Cij � bij for all ( i ,  j) E N x K, the principal gets a positive profit. In this
respect, such suboptimal mechanisms may be more reasonable than the weakly optimal 
ones. Yet ,  these mechanisms are still generically inefficient and not profit-maximizing, 
with the resulting allocations being chosen almost ad hoc; the only purpose of the agent's 
cost reports may be to insure individual rationality. The "constant rule" weakly opti­
mal mechanisms which always assign the same allocation and wages, unless vetoed by the 
agents, are even less profitable and sensitive to the environment then the mechanism sug­
gested above. Unfortunately, it is hard to find a no-loss dominant strategy IR mechanism 
that produces an allocation which is responsive to the cost reports without disturbing 
the agents' incentives to report the truth. For example, suppose the principal adapts an 
MPW mechanism truncated at zero level of profit: given the reported environment, she 
uses the MPW mechanism if it gives her non-negative profit, and chooses not to engage 
the production process otherwise. Then the agents might be tempted to misrepresent 
their costs in favor of less efficient allocations for fear of having.no .production in the case 
of truthful reports. 
To conclude, we find that if the principal has no information about the agents' costs, 
in the sense specified earlier, the dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms 
that she might use are either almost ad hoc and not sensitive to the agent's private 
information, or make the principal bear losses in some environments. There is no strongly 
optimal mechanism for the principal. The result is not surprising in view of the principal 's 
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lack of information and a strong dominant strategy requirement imposed on the agent's 
behavior. We next consider how our conclusions change if we move away from the 
principal's complete ignorance assumption. 
In the next section, we consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium framework and char­
acterize optimal Bayesian mechanisms for the expected profit-maximizing principal. We 
then return to the question of their dominant strategy implementation. 
3 Expected profit maximizing mechanisms
The results obtained for dominant strategy mechanisms under complete ignorance do 
not require any assumptions on the consistency of agents' costs characteristics across 
projects. In this section we introduce such assumption to be able to reduce the general 
problem to a special single-dimensional case. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the 
conditions necessary for Bayesian incentive compatibility of team-formation mechanisms 
can be quite restrictive even under this strong assumption. 
3 .1 The model 
Suppose now that the principal, when hiring an agent , can observe his profession, but 
cannot recognize the quality of the training, or the agent's type. In the other words, 
the principal can tell an engineer from a carpenter, but does not know how qualified 
each of them is. In general, an agent's qualification (type) may affect both the team's
output and the agent's personal costs. Yet in what follows we assume that the team's 
output is a deterministic function of the agents' professions and is uninformative about 
their quality13. The role of agents' types is to effect their personal costs of performing 
any task in a consistent way. The high-quality agents bear lower costs compared to the 
low-quality agents of the same profession. The problem of type revelation exists because 
of the presence of individual rationality constraints. 
Formally, assume that for every agent i , i E N, hi.s cost of working on each project
j, j E K, is a deterministic twice continuously differentiable non-increasing function
of his single-dimensional type ti, Cij = Cij(ti) , c�i(ti) ::; 0, c�j(ti) 2: 0. The agents'
types are stochastically ·independent Tandom --variables, distributed over the supports 
� = (0, ti] C R according to the probability distributions Hi(ti) · Each Hi(ti) is twice
continuously differentiable, with corresponding density hi(ti) ,  i E N. The distribu­
tion functions conform to the Monotone Hazard Rate property, i .e . , for every i E N, 
13For example, we can imagine that a forcing contract makes each team produce an assigned task. 
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( 1  - Hi(ti) )/hi(ti) is non-increasing in ti14. Let H(t) and h(t) denote the cumulative
distribution and density functions of vectors of types t = (t1, . .  , tn) over the support
T = xiTi, and H_i(Li) , h_i(Li) denote the corresponding distribution functions of
vectors Li = (t1, . .  , ti-I, ti+1, .. , tn) · For all i E N, the support Ti, the probability dis­
tribution function Hi(ti) , and the cost functions ci(·) : R -7 Rk are common knowledge.
Each agent's cost type is his private information. Both the principal and the agents are 
risk-neutral. The agents follow Bayesian Nash Equilibrium behavior. The principal's 
purpose is to construct a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) IR mechanism that maxi­
mizes her expected profit. Using the revelation principle15, we again restrict our attention 
to the direct revelation mechanisms. Consider mechanisms that determine probabilities 
of matrix allocations and wages for the agents as a f unction of their reported types i. 
Let X = {XIX is feasible} denote the set of all feasible matrix allocations. We
can arbitrarily order the elements in X so that X = {X1, . .  , X1 ,  . .  , X(k+l)n } . Let
L = { 1 ,  .. , l, . . , ( k + 1) n} be the set of corresponding indices, and for every l E L 
let F,, = F(X1) .  Then we can consider a (k + 1r-dimensional probability vector
P = {p1, . . , p1 ,  . .  , p(k+l)n } , where p1 represents the probability of l-th feasible matrix allo­
cation X1 • This implies the new feasibility conditions:
Pl 2: 0 for all l E L
L P1 = l .
lEL 
Equality in the second condition above indicates that X = 0 is a feasible allocation .
Further, let W = (w1, . .  , Wi, . . , wn) denote the vector of agents' wages. A direct reve­
lation mechanism then is a function from the reported types i E T into the probability
vector P E R(k+l)n and the wage vector W E Rn : g(t) = (P, W) .  We restrict our
attention to the mechanisms such that P(t) is piecewise continuously differentiable.
Some additional notation is needed for further analysis. For a given probability vector 
P, for every i E N, j E K, let Lij(P) C L denote the set of indices whose corresponding
allocations assign agent i to project j. Then
qij(P) = L Pl 
IEL;j(P) 
denotes the probabilityi)f agent-i being assignecltoprojectj:·Given-theprofile of reported 
14The Monotone Hazard Rate property together with c�j(t;) 2: 0 are the standard assumptions made
in the literature to guarantee that monotonicity constraints (see below) are not binding in the optimal 
allocation problems with single-dimensional decision space (see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole 
( 1992)) .  As we demonstrate in what follows, the assumptions remain important in the analysis of 
multi-dimensional allocation problems as well. 
15See, for example, Myerson (1979). 
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strategies i(t ) ,  agent i's utility under the mechanism (P(i) , W(t) )  is:
ui(P, W, i, t) = wi(i) - L Cij(ti )  * L P1(i) . 
jEK lEL;;(P) 
Similarly, i's expected probability of being assigned to a project j is 
and i's expected utility is, correspondingly, 
Ui(P, W, i, ti) = 




Given that the agents' type is  t and their reported strategy is  t(·), the principal gains
the profit 
7r(P, W, i, t) = L Flpz(i(t)) - L wi(i(t) ) 
and his expected profit is 
lEL iEN 
IT(P, W, i) = h (L F1P1(i(t) ) - L wi(i(t) ) )h(t) dt .T lEL iEN 
(22) 
(23) 
Let ui(P, W, t) and Ui(P, W, ti) denote agent's i utility and expected utility when the
agents report their true types, i.e., i(t) = t. Then the principal's problem can be stated
as follows: 
max r (L Fzpz(t) - L wi(t) )h(t) dt P(t),W(t) Jr lEL iEN 
subject to: 
pz ( t) � 0 for any l E L
LP1(t) = 1
lEL 
Ui (P, W, ti )  �
� h (wi(t_i , ii) - L Cij(ti )  * L pz(t-i , ii) )h-i(t_i ) dt_iT_; jEK lEL;;(P) 
for every i E N, any ti , any ii 







Here the feasibility constrains take the form of 25-26, and the incentive compati­
bility (BIC) 27 and individual rationality 28 constrains are written assuming Bayesian
equilibrium behavior. 
A direct revelation mechanism (P(t) , W(t) ) is optimal if it solves the problem 24-28.
3 .2 Optimal Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms 
Note that the assumption c�(ti )  � 0 insures that the single-crossing property, or the
constant sign condition (Guesnerie, Laffont (1984) )  holds; i.e. , the agents ' costs on each 
project change with their types in a consistent manner. This allows us to use the stan­
dard techniques developed for the analysis of mechanism design problems in a Bayesian 
framework16 .  Consider the necessary conditions for Bayesian incentive compatibility17 .  
Proposition 7 (Interim monotonicity) If a feasible direct revelation mechanism 
(P(t) , W(t) ) is Bayesian incentive compatible, then for any i E N, any si , ti E Ti the 
fallowing is true: 
L (cij (ti )  - Cij(si ) ) (Qij(P, ti )  - Qij(P, si ) )  � 0 . (29) 
jEK 
We call the above condition "monotonicity" in analogy to the one-project case, where 
the condition reduces to the requirement that the expected probability of employment is 
monotonic in an agent's type. For the multi-project case the condition becomes more de­
manding. First, as in a one-project case, it requires that an agent of a higher type should 
be hired with higher expected probability than an agent of a lower type. Second, with 
respect to shifting an agent's employment probabilities among the projects, it requires 
that an agent should be more likely to be assigned to the project where his cost decrease 
is the fastest among the projects. We first solve for the optimal mechanism assuming 
that the necessary conditions for BIC hold, and then characterize the conditions under 
which this assumption holds. 
In the spirit of Myerson's (1981) analysis, for every i E N, j E K, let
1 - H·(t · )
Jij(ti) =: Cij(ti) - C�j(ti )  hi(t:) t (30) 
denote agent 's i virtual cost of working on a project j. Similarly, define a virtual surplus 
S(X) of an allocation X by
S(X; t) = F(X) - L L Jij(ti )Xij . (31 ) 
iEN jEK 
16See Fudenberg and Tirole ( 1992), chapter 7, for an overview. 
17The proofs for the propositions in this section are given in section 6. 
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Proposition 8 A direct revelation mechanism (P(t) , W(t)) of the form 
[
1 if X1 maximizes S(X; t) subject to 
Pt = 
0 
interim monotonicity constraint 29; 
otherwise ; 
wi(ti ) = L Cij(ti )Qij(ti )  - [ti L c�i(1i)Qij(1i) d1i 
jEK Jo jEK 
for all i E N, all ti E �
is optimal for the principal18 •  
(32) 
(33) 
Hence, an optimal mechanism, within the constraint imposed by monotonicity, chooses 
an allocation that maximizes virtual social surplus and offers each agent an expected 
payment which is never lower than his expected costs of employment (the latter follows
from the assumption that c�(ti )  :::; 0) . Similar to the optimal auctions results (Myerson
( 1981) ) ,  we find that, first, the optimal team-formation mechanisms are generically inef­
ficient, since the principal trades off some efficiency for higher expected profit. Second, 
there exists the whole class of equivalent optimal BIC mechanisms which differ from each 
other in the form of actual wages paid to the agents; expected wages are given by 33. 
Also note that, similarly to the optimal auction, an agent's probability of being hired 
under an optimal mechanism is a non-decreasing function of his type: Provided that the 
Monotone Hazard rate condition and the assumption c�'/ ti )  ;::: 0 hold for all i , j ,  we get
that Jfi(ti )  :::; 0 for any i, j. This important observation is useful for the further analysis;
we state it as the following lemma: 
Lemma 3 Under an optimal mechanism of the form 32-33, for any t E T, any i E N, 
agent i 's probability of employment LjEK Xij(t-i , ti ) is a non-decreasing function of his
type ti .
The optimal BIC mechanisms differ depending on whether the interim monotonicity 
constraints 29 are ever binding. If H(t) and c/s are such that the constraints are not
binding, then the optimal mechanism is explicitly given in Proposition 7. Otherwise, 
bunching is optimal over the ranges of types where the monotonicity is binding19 . We 
now proceed with the analysis of the restrictiveness of the monotonicity constraints 29. 
18In the above statement we ignore the possibility that there may exist more than one allocation X 
that maximizes the virtual surplus. Generically, these cases occur with probability zero. However, if such 
a situation emerges, an optimal mechanism, equivalent to 32-33, randomly chooses one of the efficient 
allocations. 
19See Guesnerie and Laffont ( 1984) for an exposition of bunching technique. 
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3.3 Analysis of mono to nicity requireme nts 
To see that the constraints 29 can be indeed rather restrictive and often binding, consider
the following example. 
Example (Restrictiveness of the monotonicity constraint) Consider the problem of
hiring one agent on two alternative projects, i .e . ,  let n = 1 ,  k = 2 .  Let F1 = 100, 
F2 = 98. Suppose that the agent's cost type t is uniformly distributed on (0, 5) , and let
c1(t) = 3/(t + 0 .1 ) + 10, c2(t) = 20 - 4t. Note that the uniform distribution conforms to
the Monotone Hazard Rate property and the cost functions are decreasing and convex, 
as required by the initial assumptions. We demonstrate that the monotonicity condition 
29, which in this case takes the form of ex-post monotonicity,
L ( Cj ( t) - Cj ( s) )  ( x j ( P, t) - x j ( P, s ) )  :::; 0 ' 
jEK 
(34) 
is not trivially satisfied. Take s = 0 .23 and t = 2 .5 and let us compute the virtual surplus
maximizing allocations X(s) ,  X(t) . Since c1(s) = 19 .08, c2(s) = 19.08, c1(t) = 1 1 . 15, 
c2(t) = 10; (1 - H(s))/h(s) = 0 .19 ,  (1 - H(t) )/h(t) = 0 . 1 ; c�(s) = -27.59, c�(s) = -4, 
c� (t) = -0.44, c�(t) = -4, we obtain J1(s) = 24.7, J2(s) = 19.84, J1(t) = 1 1 .55, 
J2(t) = 10.04. Therefore,
S\(s) = 75 .3 S2(s) = 78.2 S1(t) = 88.45 S2(t) = 87.96 
Xi (s) = O  X2(s) = l X1(t) = l  X2(t) = O . 
However, the above allocations do not conform to the monotonicity constraint 34 and
therefore cannot be chosen: 
(c1(t) - c1(s) ) (x1(t) - x1(s)) + (c2(t) - c2(s) ) (x2(t) - x2(s) )  = 
= (1 1 . 15  - 19.08) (1 - 0) + (10 - 19.08) (0 - 1 ) = 1 . 15  > 0 . 
Figure 1 gives a graphical illustration of the above example. Note that the graphs
of the cost functions for the two projects intersect more than once, which indicates 
that there is no consistency in the cost change on one project relative to the other. 
Specifically, there is a switch in the relative rate of cost decrease between the projects: 
c� (s) < c�(s ) ,  but c�(t) > c�(t) . As a consequence it is possible that with the change in
type the true costs change in favor of one project, whereas the virtual costs change in 
favor of the other. Under these rather typical circumstances, the monotonicity constraint 
can be violated quite easily, as the example above shows. Be1ow, we present sufficient 
conditions for monotonicity, which guarantee that the above situation is never the case20.
The condition states that the difference in the rates of cost decreases between any two 
projects does not change "too much" compared to the difference in the change in the 
absolute costs between the projects. 
20The sufficient conditions for monotonicity presented in propositions 9 and 10 are specific for Xii E 
{O, 1 }  case. 
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cost 
4 0  
3 0  
2 0  
1 0  
type 
5 
Figure 1 :  An example of cost functions violating sufficient conditions for monotonicity:
Cj (t) = 3/(t + 0 .1 )  + 10, ck (t) = 20 - 4t, t E (0, 5) . 
Proposition 9 (Sufficient conditions for monotonicity) The monotonicity conditions 29 
are satisfied if the following is true: 
For every i E N, any si , ti E Ti , any j, k E K, j =/= k ,  if 
then 
(35) 
1 - Hi (si )  , 1 - Hi(ti) , 
(cij (si) - Cij (ti ) )  - (Cik ( si) - Cik (ti ) )  > ( hi ( si) 
cij (si )  - hi (ti) 
(cij (ti ) )  -
1 - H· (s · ) 1 - H· (t · )  
-( hi (s
i
i ) t 
c�k (si )  - hi (t:) i (c�k (ti ) )  . (36) 
Moreover, the above condition is also sufficient to guarantee that the ex-post monotonicity 
requirement is satisfied: if for any i E N, any Si , ti E Ti 35 implies 36, then for all 
Li E T_i the following -inequali,ty.holds: 
L (cij (ti ) - Cij ( si ) ) (xij (t) - Xij (si , Li) )  :S 0 . 
jEK 
(37) 
Outline of the proof The complete proof is given in the section 6 ;  here we present the
outline to show that the above conditions guarantee not only interim, but also ex-post 
monotonicity. 
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We show that virtual surplus maximization 
m;x{F(X) - L L Jij (ti)Xij } iEN jEK 
implies that for any i E N, any Si , ti 
L (Jij (ti )  - Jij (si ) ) (xij (ti )  - Xij (si ) )  � 0 ,
jEK 
which, under the conditions stated in the proposition, in turn implies 





The latter inequality is ex-post monotonicity, which is clearly stronger than interim 
monotonicity and implies it . D 
The form of the sufficient conditions together with the earlier example suggest that 
the conditions that guarantee monotonicity are not trivial and do not generically hold. 
Rather, they are satisfied for certain groups of type distributions and cost functions. In 
particular, the monotonicity conditions hold if each agent's costs change in a consistent 
manner not only with types, but also from project to project. We state this case in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 10 Suppose that for every i E N, for every pair of projects j, k E K, either 
( 41)  
or 
( 42) 
Then the monotonicity conditions 29, as well as 37, are satisfied. 
The set of assumptions presented in the proposition 10 implies that for each agent, 
the projects are ranked with respect to the rates in cost changes; this ranking does not 
change with types. This can be interpreted as a single-crossing property for the cost 
functions of each agent: under the given conditions, an agent's cost functions for any two 
projects j and k can intersect at most once (compare this to the cost functions in the
example above) . Figure 2 illustrates the idea. 
The above versions of sufficient conditions for the monotonicity, together with the 
standard single-crossing property guaranteed by the assumption c�j � 0 for any i, j ,  
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cost 
3 5  
3 0  
2 5  
2 0  
1 5  
1 0  
5 
type 
1 2 3 4 5 
Figure 2 :  An example of cost functions satisfying sufficient conditions for monotonicity:
cj(t) = (x - 6)2 - 1 ,  ck(t) = (x - 7)2 /4 + 5, t E [O, 5) . 
present a set of very restrictive regularity requirements. Although the necessary and 
sufficient conditions21 for the interim monotonicity may be less restrictive, the exam­
ple presented in this section demonstrates that some consistency in each agent's cost 
functions for different projects may still be required. The above analysis indicates that 
the monotonicity conditions become much harder to satisfy once we move from one­
dimensional to multi-dimensional decision spaces. Therefore, under a broad range of cir­
cumstances, bunching will be optimal over wide ranges of an agent's type. This suggests 
that multidimensionality of decision variables, through making monotonicity conditions 
more restrictive, may substantially decrease the principal's expected profit compared to 
a one-dimensional (one-project) allocation problem. 
For the rest of the section, we restrict our attention to the cases when the necessary 
monotonicity conditions are not binding, and therefore the optimal BIC mechanism is of 
the form explicitly presented in proposition 7. 
21The necessary and sufficient conditions are not considered here for the reason that they differ de­
pending on the values of the observed productivity parameters; obtaining sensible necessary conditions 
requires imposition of certain regularity requirements on productivities, which would narrow the scope 
of the analysis. 
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3.4 Implementation in dominant strategies 
Following the results of Mookherjee and Reichelstein ( 1992) ,  we now show that an op­
timal BIC mechanism can be equivalently implemented in dominant strategies with no 
expected loss to the principal. This brings us back to the problem initially stated in 
section 2 - the one of finding an optimal profit-maximizing dominant strategy incentive
compatible mechanism. The following result shows that if the principal knows a prior 
distribution of the agents ' cost types there exists an optimal, in the sense of expected 
profit maximization, DSIC IR mechanism. 
Proposition 1 1  Suppose that the cost functions ci(ti) and the distribution Junctions 
Hi (ti ) ,  i E N, are such that the ex-post monotonicity conditions 37 are satisfied. Then 
the direct revelation mechanism (X(t) , W(t) ) ,  given by 
X*(t) = X that maximizes S(X; t) , 
wi(t) = L Cij(ti)x;j(t) - Inti L c�j(r)x;j(t_i, r) dr
jEK O jEK 
for all i E N, ti E 1i , Li E T _i , 
(43) 
( 44)
is a dominant strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism 
which yields the same expected profit as the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible mech­
anism 32-33. 
The above proposition says that we can replace the optimal BIC mechanism with an 
equivalent DSIC mechanism22 . Moreover, since the DSIC constraints are more restrictive 
than the BIC constraints, we have also established 
Corollary 6 If the cost functions ci(ti) and the distribution Junctions Hi(ti ) , i E N, 
are such that the sufficient conditions J or monotonicity (proposition 9) are satisfied, then 
43-44 is an optimal expected profit maximizing dominant strategy incentive compatible 
individually rational mechanism. 
To draw a parallel with the section 2 results� note that the above mechanism is not an
efficiency-maximizing Groves mechanism, but it does have certain incentive properties in 
common with it. First observe that an agent's type report affects his wage only through 
the allocation decision; within the same allocation of an agent, his wage is constant in his 
22The finding still holds if the Xij 's are continuous variables. 
27 
own report. Indeed, for any i E N  and any Li E T_i, suppose xi ( Li , ti) = xi (t-i, si ) = xj 
for some ti =/= si · Let ti > si . Then, by 44, 
( 45) 
Second, sufficient conditions for monotonicity 35-36 guarantee that, given the al­
location rule 43, an agent's true cost report maximizes his own utility as well as the
principal's  objective function23 . Comparing these findings with the properties of the 
DSIC IR mechanisms under complete ignorance, we find that the principal's knowledge 
of the probability distributions of the agents' cost types - at least in the special case 
when these types are one-dimensional - is decisive in determining the employment rules 
which insure that ( i) individual rationality holds and (ii) the expected profit is nonneg­
ative24 and is maximized. In contrast, under complete ignorance nearly the only way to 
satisfy individual rationality in DSIC mechanisms was to sacrifice the profit maximiza­
tion motive and either choose random allocations or pay unreasonably high wages to the 
agents. One might conclude that no matter how well or poorly informed the agents are 
about each other's costs, the principal 's possession of information is crucial for her profit 
maximization. 
4 A note on Nash equilibrium mechanisms
In the above study, we ignored the case of the extreme informational asymmetry - that 
is, when the principal is "completely ignorant" (as defined in section 2) but the agents
themselves are well-informed about each other's characteristics . Assuming that under 
this information structure the agents follow Nash equilibrium behavior, we present two 
23In fact, given any L; E T_; ,  i 's assignment and, respectively, his wage are step functions of his type
report t;. This follow_s.from the form of the allocation rule 43. and J:.cmtinuity . .of ..l.;j ( t.;) in t ; .  Thus, for ev­
ery i E N we can identify a collection of threshold types { siO (L;)  = 0, Bil (L;) ,  . . .  , s;L (L;)  = f; } ,  L < oo,
such that xi (L; , t;) and, consequently, wi(L;, t;) are constant within each interval (sil-i (L;) ,  sil (L; ) ) ,
l = 1 ,  . . ,  L. Note that since i's probability of employment is non-deceasing in  his type (lemma 3),
xi(L;,  t;) = 0 if t; E [O, sil (L;))  and LjEK xii (L;,  t;) = 1 otherwise. Then one can easily show that
i's wage at each allocation is a function of his costs at the threshold types only, and does not directly 
depend on his own type report. 
24By construction of the optimal mechanism, an allocation X = 0 is always an option, which guarantees 
that the expected profit is nonnegative. 
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notes on the Nash equilibrium mechanisms. First, we find that if the agents follow 
Nash equilibrium behavior, the principal can design mechanisms that will always secure 
her a non-negative profit, but generically cannot guarantee her most preferred outcome. 
However, we further demonstrate that if the agents are sequentially rational, there exist 
sequential mechanisms that allow the principal to acquire, almost costlessly, all the hid­
den information and obtain an outcome which is arbitrarily close to her most preferred 
alternative. In other words, under certain circumstances the principal can use the agents' 
self-interest to accumulate the hidden information at a low cost. 
4 .1 Nash implementation and the first best 
Assume that the agents have complete information about each other's types and fol­
low Nash equilibrium behavior. However, the principal has no information about the 
agents' costs characteristics and can pursue her own interests only by setting the "rules 
of the game" , or the mechanism under which the agents are employed and paid for 
their jobs. Without focusing on any specific Nash equilibrium mechanism, we use the 
Nash implementation theory framework to consider what levels of principal 's profit are 
implementable in Nash equilibrium. 
As in section 2, let (F, C) characterize an environment, and let (:F, C) be the set of
all possible environments, as given in section 2 . 1 .  A feasible alternative a = (X, W) is a
feasible allocation X and a wage matrix W such that I LiEN LjEK Wij I ::::; M, where M
is a big enough real number25 . Denote by A the set of all feasible alternatives26 .  The 
principal's profit corresponding to an alternative a in an environment (F, C) , 7r (a; (F, C)) ,  
is given by 2 .  With the agents' utility functions given by equation 3 ,  the agents' cost
parameters bear sufficient information about their utility functions. Since F is observable
for the principal, given any F E :F we can present a choice rule as a correspondence Gp: 
C -+ A; denote by G F ( C) the resulting choice set. Then G F is implementable in Nash
equilibrium if there exists a game with the set of Nash equilibria coinciding with the 
choice set Gp(C) . 
Consider whether the principal's most preferred choice set is implementable in Nash 
equilibrium. Since we assume that the agents always have an option not to participate in 
the game proposed by the principal, a chosen allocation and wage have to be individually 
rational for every agent. Therefore, in any environment the.principal prefers the choice 
rule that gives her first best, or the complete information outcome given by 9-10 . Given
, 
25For example, we can choose M = Li LJ C;jXij , where c; = sup{c; l c; E C; } ,  and X maximizes
F(X) - L; Lj c;jXij - Restrictions on the range of possible wages are imposed for the tractability of
analysis; otherwise the agents might unanimously prefer infinitely large wages. 
26Note that the set of feasible alternatives is not constrained to the set of individually rational alter­
natives and therefore stays the same for every environment. 
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F E :F, the principal's first best is the following choice rule:
( 46) 
where, as before, S(X;  (F, C)) denotes the social surplus of an allocation. We can show
that for almost all (:F, C) this rule violates the monotonicity property which is necessary
for implementability in Nash equilibrium (Maskin, 1979) , and thus establish
Proposition 12  Suppose the set of possible cost profiles C is such that for every F E  :F 
there exists C E C which satisfies the following conditions: for every surplus-maximizing
allocation X* (F, C) there exists at least one pair (i , j ) ,  i E N, j E K for which xij (F, C) = 
1 and Cij > inf{cij l cij E CiiJ ·  Then the principal 's first best is not implementable in Nash
Equilibrium. 
We conclude that under the Nash equilibrium behavior hypothesis, the principal can­
not always get her most preferred alternative if she has no information about the en­
vironment27 .  The proof of the proposition 1228 also shows that no matter what Nash 
equilibrium mechanism the principal uses, under many cost profiles she has to give to 
the agents substantial shares of social surplus in order to sustain monotonicity. Note, 
however, that the principal can use her power as mechanism designer to obtain the out­
comes which are always individually rational for herself. We introduce the notion of 
an acceptable alternative, which corresponds to the notion of feasibility for the game of 
surplus redistribution without a principal. 
Definition 9 An alternative a =  (X, W) E A  is called acceptable if 
F(X) - L L WijXij � 0 .
j 
Proposition 13 For any environment, the principal can guarantee an outcome from the
set of acceptable alternatives. 
Proof Consider any mechanism that includes-theioUowing element. Given observable 
productivities F, for any (X, W) ,  determined according to some choice rule, let
(X* W*) = [ (X, W) ' (0, 0) 
if F(X) - LiEN LjEK WijXij � 0 
otherwise . (47) 
27The result depends crucially on the assumption that X;j E {0, 1 } ,  as the proof in section 6 shows.
28The proof is given in section 6. 
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Thus, the principal can "veto" any outcome that gives her a negative payoff by choosing 
not to employ anybody. D 
We summarize the above findings in the following corollary. 
Corollary 7 If the agents follow Nash equilibrium behavior, the principal can guarantee 
herself a non-negative profit, but cannot guarantee her first best. 
4.2 Se que ntial mechanisms 
Surprisingly, the situation drastically changes in favor of the principal if we assume 
that the agents follow subgame perfect Nash equilibrium behavior. In this case, the 
principal can use simple sequential mechanisms to implement the outcomes that in any 
environment are arbitrarily close to her first best alternative. Indeed, we prove the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 14 If the agents follow subgame perfect Nash equilibrium behavior, for any 
arbitrarily small E > 0 there exists an individually rational mechanism Gt(F, C) = (X, W) 
such that for any environment (F, C) 
7r(Gt(F, C)) � (1 - t)7r*(F, C) ,
where 7r*(F, C) is the principal 's complete information profit level.
Proof Consider the following sequential mechanism29 •  For an arbitrary E > 0 ,  choose
E1 > 0, E2 > 0 so that E1 + E2 .::; E. Pick randomly two agents m, l E N. Let each stage of
the mechanism be observable to the agents. At stage 1 ,  let agent l choose a k-dimensional 
vector Xm and a scalar sm, such that Xm constitutes a feasible allocation of agent m. At 
stage 2, let agent m choose an (n - 1 )  x k matrix X_m and a (n - 1 )-dimensional vector
S_m, where, again, X_m is a feasible allocation of agents other than i .  At stage 3, allow
any agent to veto m's or l's choices by reporting "no."  Define the following "profit" 
function: 
p(X, S) = F(X) - L Si . (48) 
iEN 
Finally, let the mechanism choose the resulting outcome (X* ,  W*) by the following rule.
For every i E N, every j E K, let
X�· = [ 0 tJ Xij 
if "no" has been reported by any agent 
otherwise ; 
291 am grateful to John Duggan for suggesting the idea of this mechanism to me.
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(49) 
W�·  = [ :; + E1p(X, S)iJ Sm + E2p(X, S) 
0 
if x;j = 1 and i =/= l , i =/= m 
if x;j = 1 and i = l
if xii = 1 and i = m 
otherwise . 
(50) 
Using backwards induction reasoning, we now show that any two chosen agents will 
pick an efficient allocation X and the "base wage" vector S with si = L,jEK CijXij for every
i E N. From stage 3, agents l and m cannot be better-off by choosing Si < L,jEK cijXij 
for any i since then their choice will be vetoed and their gain will be identically zero. 
This guarantees individual rationality of the mechanism. Next, on stage 2 agent m, 
with his assignment and "base wage" Sm already given, can only maximize his utility by
maximizing the principal 's profit. This implies that he will choose a surplus-maximizing 
allocation, constrained to his own allocation, and "base wages" Si :::; L,iEK CijXij , i .e. ,
si = L,jEK CijXij for every agent including l. Hence at stage 1 agent l knows that no
matter what choices he makes, the difference between his "base wage" and cost at his 
assignment will be identically zero. Therefore, agent l also can increase his utility only 
through maximizing the principal's profit. It follows that agent l will pick an assignment 
for m that is consistent with an efficient allocation, and choose Sm = L,jEK CmjXmj . D
The above analysis indicates that, assuming sequential rationality, a completely unin­
formed principal can almost costlessly acquire all the information he needs to implement 
his most preferred outcome. All she needs to do is to hire two informed agents on a profit­
sharing basis30 . One might conclude that the agents do not always gain from having more 
information: As our results on dominant strategy mechanisms show, if the agents them­
selves are ignorant of the other agents' cost types, the principal often needs to pay huge 
information rents to accumulate the dispersed private information. Yet ,  the agents '  com­
plete information case more readily applies to situations where the agents have a past 
experience of working together than to newly formed teams in flexible organizations. 
5 Conclusion 
In considering the multiple teams formation problem, we were able to demonstrate sev­
eral points. First, most generally, the principal's knowledge of the information structure 
of the agents' charact-eristics is -crucial for her -profit'-marimization -motive - as opposed 
to efficiency maximization, where no information on the principal 's part is required to 
make an efficient decision. If a principal starts a new project (or a new firm) with no idea 
how costly this project might be for her, then, even with no nature-induced uncertainty 
and the information dispersed among the agents, she is likely to run into losses in an at­
tempt to have agents truthfully reveal this information. Yet ,  if the agents themselves are 
30Think of foremen who are put in authority over groups of workers or particular operations in a plant. 
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well-informed about each others' characteristics, the principal can use their self-interest 
to accumulate this information at a low cost. If the principal is aware of the distribution 
of the agents' cost characteristics, there exists a well-defined optimal mechanism that 
maximizes her expected profit. However, when the decision space becomes more com­
plicated, as in the multiproject case, the incentive compatibility constraints are more 
likely to become binding and thus reduce the principal 's profit by often making her treat 
"good" and "bad" agents equally. 
Competition among agents might substitute for the information needed by the prin­
cipal. We learn that in perfectly competitive environments the principal may collect all 
the social surplus without having any information on the distribution of the agent 's costs . 
This is also the case when efficiency gains from team production are low. On the other 
hand, when each agent is indispensable and the efficiency gains from team production are 
high, the principal is very likely to bear losses . This suggests that a principal might pre­
fer to run a robustly-structured enterprise with homogeneous labor factors and standard 
tasks rather than a flexible corporation with highly innovative tasks and indispensable 
agents. Changing to the latter requires acquisition of new information about the agents' 
characteristics, which might turn out to be very costly for the principal in a hierarchy. 
Turning back to our initial question, we find that the appeal for partnerships in 
the context of flexible organizational forms has theoretical explanations. The agents 
might want to organize themselves as partners and share efficiency gains from their joint 
activities when it cannot be profitably done by an outside principal. Yet, incentive 
compatibility needs to be sustained within a partership, as well as a principal-run firm, 
if the agents have incomplete information about each other. This important problem has 
to be addressed before we can argue in favor of partnerships. Still, when the agents are 
well-informed about each others' characteristics, parterships appear to be a feasible way 
to achieve higher efficiency by means of flexible organizational forms. Small consulting 
firms working on a variety of different tasks is the most obvious example. 
As the other side of the same conclusion, we might expect large hierarchical structures 
to have major incentive problems, either on the principals' or on the agents' side, in 
attempts to reorganize towards more flexible internal structures. A possible solution 
might be in reducing informational asymmetries or, possibly, changing the ownership 
structure towards partnerships. 
6 Proofs of the statements
Proofs for section 2 Proof of Lemma 1 Let n*(F, C) denote the profit that the
principal would be able to get in an environment (F, C) if she had complete informa­
tion. Suppose there exists a strongly optimal DSIC IR mechanism g(F, C) such that 
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7r(g (F, C) )  < 7r* (F, C) for some environment (F, C) .  Then consider the following degen­
erate direct revelation mechanism g(F, C) : Denote by X*(F) an allocation that maxi-
mizes 
n k 
F(X) - L L  CijXij . 
i=l j=l 
Then for any (F, 6) choose (X(6) , W(6) )  such that
Xij = 
[ � 
Wij = [ �ii
if xij (F) = 1 and Gj :::; Cij 
otherwise 
if xii = 1 
otherwise 
Note that, first, g(F, C) is DSIC and IR for any environment and, second, for the
environment (F, C) it provides the principal the level of profit
7r(9(F, C) )  = 7r* (F, 6) > 7r(g (F, 6)) . 
This contradicts our initial supposition that g(F, C) is strongly optimal. D
Proof of Lemma 2 For the class of problems with no production, any efficiency­
maximizing DSIC mechanism has to be a Groves mechanism, with the transfers (wages) 
given in the form (Green and Laffont, 1977) : 
L WijX;j = - L L  C/jXij (ci , 6_i) + h(6-i) .
j l:f:i j 
Introduction of production, however, changes the social efficiency criterion and corre­
spondingly modifies the form of the transfer function . Consider the problem of choosing 
a socially efficient allocation in the variant with observable production. One can easily 
show that a direct revelation mechanism is DSIC if and only if it satisfies the following 
properties (this is a modified "Property A" (Green and Laffont, 1977) ) : 
(i) . For all i ,  Wi is independent of ci at X* ; i .e . ,  for any F, 6_i , Ci , c� ,  if X* (ci , 6_i , F) = 
X* (c� ,  6_i , F) , then Wi (G-, 6_i , F) = Wi (� , 6_i , F) .  
(ii) . Wi (ci , 6_i , F) - wi (c� , 6_i , F) = 
= [F(X*) - :L :L c1jxij (ci , 6-i , F)] - [F({xij } ) - :L :L c1jX1j (c� , 6-i , F) ] , 
l:f:i j l:f:i j 
where X* maximizes F(X) - L:i L:i CijXij (ci , 6_i) ,  and X maximizes F(X) 
Li L:j cijXij (c� ,  6_i) · 
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Next we can show that the only mechanisms that satisfy these properties are the 
Modified Groves (as defined above) . Moreover, all the properties of the standard Groves
mechanism hold for the modified version31 . Therefore, the results regarding the standard
Groves mechanisms apply. 0 
Proof of Proposition 2 By construction, the MPW mechanism is Modified Groves, 
which implies that it is DSIC and efficient. It is left to show that it is individually 





l: (w;j - cij)x;j 2: 0 . (52) 
j=l 
0 
Proof of Proposition 3 As before, let X* ( F, C) denote an efficient allocation of the set
N of agent, and X_i (F, C_i ) - an efficient allocation of the set { N\  i} agents. Besides, let
N*(F, C) be the set of employed agents: N*(F, C) = { i E NI 2:j xij = 1 } .  By corollary
3,  it is sufficient to show that for every (F, C) 
(53) 
iEN* iEN* 
for any h(C) = (h1 (C_1 ) , . .  , hn (C-n ) )  such that the corresponding Modified Groves mech­
anism is individually rational for any (F, C) . Suppose this is not the case. Then there
exists an environment (F, C) and a vector-function h(C) = (h1 (C_1 ) , . .  , hn (C-n ) ) , with
the corresponding individually rational Modified Groves mechanism g(F, C) , such that
(54) 
31The proofs go exactly as they would for the Groves mechanisms and hence do not present anything 
new of interest; see Green and Laffont ( 1977) for the original proofs. 
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This in turn implies that 
- S(X-i (F, C_i ) )  > hi (C_i) for some i E N* . (55) 
We now show that this leads to the violation of individual rationality in certain environ­
ments. Note that since any Modified Groves mechanism is social surplus maximizing, we 
have 
S(X* (F, C)) - S(X-i (F, C_i ) )  2: 0 iff i E N* . 
Two cases are possible: 
(i) S(X* (F, C)) = S(X-i (F, C_i) ) . If condition 55 holds, then individual rationality
for i is violated . Hence, this cannot be the case. 
(ii) S(X* (F, C)) > S(X-i (F, C_i) ) .  Then suppose S(X*) - S(X-i) = a > 0. In
accordance with 55, let hi (C-i )  = -S(X-i) - c for some c > 0. Then
and 
L w;jxij = F(X*) - L L  C[jXij + h( c_i) = 
j l� j 
= S(X*) + L cijxij - S(X-i) - c = L CijXij + a  - c 
j j 
Ui = l:(w;j - Cij)xij = a  - c .
j 
Now consider a different environment (F, C) ,  such that Cij = Cij + a  - c/2 for all j ,
c1j = c1j for all l I- i ,  all j .  Then
S(X* (F, C))  - S(X-i (F, Ci) ) = c/2 > 0 ,
i is still chosen and the whole allocation does not change: X = X* ( F, C) = X* ( F, C) . 
Further, wi = w; , where wi = wi (F, C) ,  w; = wi (F, C) . Then
ui(F, C) = L(Wij - Cij)Xij = 
j 
= L(wij - Cij - a + c/2)xij = (a - c) - a + c/2 = -c/2 < 0 , (56) 
j 
which contradicts individual rationality. D 
Proof of Corollary 4 The principal gets a non-negative payoff if 7r(X*) = F(X*) -
� .  � · w'!«x* . > 0 Buti J iJ iJ - • 
! ) 
= F(X* ) - l: S* - L L CijXij + l: S-i = 
! i j 
= ( 1  - n)S* + L s_i ' 
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(57) 
which is non-negative only if 16  holds. D 
Proof of Corollary 5 In this case,
i j 
= L §_i - (n - �)S* = n(n - l )s (N-i) - (n - l )ns* (N) = 
i 
= n(n - l ) [s (N-i) - s* (N)] � 0 (58) 
since n � 1 and by definition 2. D
Proofs for section 3 Proof of Proposition 7 Let U(P, W, si l ti ) denote i's utility of
reporting Si when his true type is ti , given the mechanism (P, W) .  Then one can easily
show that 
U(P, W, si lti )  = U(P, W, si) - L (cij (ti )  - Cij (si ) )Qij (P, si )  . 
jEK 
If the mechanism (P, W) is BIC, then for any Si , ti E �
and 
or, equivalently, 
U(P, W, ti ) � U(P, W, si) - L (cij (ti )  - Cij ( si ) )Qij (P, si )  , (59) 
jEK 
U(P, W, si )  � U(P, W, ti) - L (cij (si )  - Cij (ti ) )Qij (P, ti )  . (60) 
It follows that 
L (cij ( si )  - Cij (ti ) )Qij (P, si) :::; 
jEK 
jEK 
:::; U(P, W, ti) - U(P, W, si) :::; L (cij ( si )  - Cij (ti ) )Qij (P, ti) (61)  
jEK 
which yields 29. D 
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Proof of Proposition 8 For simplicity of notation, let U(P, W, si l ti )  = U(si l ti ) ,  U(P, vV, ti )  = 
U(ti ) · Incentive compatibility means that
From the Envelope theorem, if the mechanism is incentive compatible, then 
or 
u; (ti) = - I: c�j ( ti )Qij ( ti )  (62) 
jEK 
for all i, all ti E Ji. Integrating both sides of the equation and letting Ui(O) = 0, we
obtain: 
(63) 
Individual rationality is then guaranteed for all i , all ti E Ti since c� (ti )  < 0 by
assumption. Let Wi(ti ) denote i's expected wage. Then, by definition,
Ui (ti) = Wi( ti) - L Cij (ti )Qij (ti )  ' 
jEK 
and therefore the expected wage is 
We now show that 29 and 63 together imply incentive compatibility, i .e. , 
for any ti , si . From 63 and 64,
U(si l ti ) = U(si) - L (cij (ti )  - Cij (si ) )Qij ( si )  , 
jEK 




Observe that the above always holds since the necessary condition for monotonicity 29 
implies that 
L c�j (r) (Qij (T) - Qij (si ) )  :::; 0
jEK 
for all T 2: Si · The case Si > ti is established by reversing the inequality signs twice.
Incentive compatibility and individual rationality are therefore established. Finally, 
since 
IT(P) = Et{L FIP1 (t) - L L Cij (t)Qij (t) - L Ui (ti ) }  ' 
IEL iEN jEK iEN 
where Et denotes expected value over the domain of t, substitution of the expression 63
into the principal 's objective function, after standard transformations, yields: 
1 - H· (t · ) II(P) = Et{L FIP1 (t) - L L (Cij (ti ) - c�j (ti) h · (t�) 
i ) (  L P1 ) }  =
IEL iEN jEK i i IEL;j 
= Et{L F1P1 (t) - L L Jij (ti) (  L P1 ) }  . (65)  
IEL iEN jEK 
Since both the principal's and the agents' utility functions are linear in allocation X,  
there cannot be any gain from randomization over X. The optimal choice of P(t) follows.
0 
Proof of Proposition 9 By proposition 8, the optimal mechanism chooses an allocation
X ( t) to maximize, subject to the monotonicity constraint,
S(X; t) = F(X) - L L Jij (ti )Xij . 
iEN jEK 
We first show that this implies that for any i E N, any si , ti 




Given the form of the optimal employment rule an agent's probability of being hired 
is non-decreasing in his type (lemma 3) . .Thus, we..can .r.estrict .our attention to the case
of an agent being moved from one project to another, within the range of the types 
where the agent is employed. In the latter case, for an arbitrary Li E T_i , let X* be
the allocation that maximizes 66 given (t_i , si ) ,  and .1Y - an allocation that maximizes
66 given (Li , ti ) · Suppose that agent i is optimally employed at project j being of type
si ,  but is optimally moved to the project k when his type changes to ti : x';j = 1 ,  x';k = 0
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for all k =j:. j ,  and Xik = 1 , Xij = 0 for all j =j:. k .  Then
S(X* ; Li , si )  = F(X*) - L L  Jij (ti )x;i - Jij ( si) ?:: S(X; Li , si) 
l¥i jEK 
for any feasible X ; 
S(X; Li , ti ) = F(X) - L L  Jij (ti)Xij - Jik (ti ) ?:: S(X; Li , ti) 
l¥i jEK 
for any feasible .X . 
In particular, 
F(X*) - L L  Jij (t1 )x;i - Jij (si )  ?:: F(X) - L L  ltj (tz )Xzj - Jik ( si )  (68) 
l¥i jEK l'i:i jEK 
and 
or 
F(X) - L L  ltj (tz )Xzj - Jik (ti )  ?:: F(X*) - L L  l1j (t1 )x;i - Jii (ti )  . (69) 
l¥i jEK l'i:i jEK 
Combining the two above inequalities, we obtain 
L (Jij (ti) - Jij (Bi ) ) (Xij (ti , Li) - Xij (Bi ,  Li) ) ::; 0 .
jEK 
(70) 
Note that interim monotonicity certainly holds if ex-post monotonicity holds, i .e. , 
L (cij (ti ) - Cij ( si) ) (xij (ti , Li) - Xij ( si , Li) )  ::; 0 , 
jEK 
(71 )  
which is the case when 
whenever 




But, using the definition of Jij , the latter is always the case if the conditions stated
in the proposition hold. D 
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Proof of Proposition 10 For an arbitrary i E N, take any two j, k E K  and, without
loss of generality, suppose (i) is the case. Then for any si , ti E Ti, such that Si < ti , we
have 
which implies 
Therefore, by proposition 9 it is sufficient to show that for any si , ti E Ti such that
Bi < ti , the following inequality holds:
(74) 
Note that 
1 - H1 (ti ) I 1 - Hi (si) I r 1 - Hi (r) II d 1 - Hi (T) I 
h1 (ti )  
cij (ti )  - hi (si )  
cij (si )  = ls; ( hi (r) cij (r) + dr ( hi (r) ) cij (r) ) dr · 
Hence it is sufficient to show that for any T E [si , ti] 
(75) 
Since (1  - Hi (r))/hi (r) � 0 and the Monotone Hazard Rate condition holds, the
above inequality follows directly from the assumptions stated in the proposition. 0 
Proof of Proposition 11 First note that, given that the sufficient conditions for mono­
tonicity hold, the mechanism belongs to the class of optimal BIC mechanisms as defined 
in proposition 8; hence it is expected profit maximizing. Applying the theorem of Laf­
font and Maskin (1982) to the team-formation problem, we obtain that an allocation rule 
X(t) is implementable in dominant strategies if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied: 
L (cij (ti )  - Cij (si ) ) (xij (ti )  - Xij (si ) )  :::; 0 , (76) 
jEK 
wi (ti ) = L Cij (ti )x;j (t) - it; L c�j (r)x;j (t_i , r) dr + ei (Li)
jEK O JEI( 
for all i E N, all Li E T_i , (77) 
where ei (t_i ) is an arbitrary function that does not depend on ti . 
41 
The first condition above is dominant strategy monotonicity; by construction of the 
sufficient condition for interim monotonicity, it holds whenever the sufficient condition 
for interim monotonicity holds. In the wage function, using ei ( t-i) = 0 guarantees that
for any i, any ti E Ti, and therefore the principal 's expected profit is preserved at the
BIC optimal level. Finally, ex-post individual rationality follows from the property that 
c�j (ti) � 0 for all i , j .  0
Proofs for section 4 Proof of Proposition 12 The principal 's role is restricted to the
one of mechanism designer, and we only need to prove that the choice function given by 
46 is not Nash implementable among the agents. Since monotonicity of a social choice 
function is a necessary condition for implementability (Maskin, 1979) , it is sufficient to 
show that for any F E :F G F( C) given by 46 is non-monotonic. Consider the choice
rule given by 46 for an arbitrary F E  :F. If GF(C) is monotonic, then for any C, C, if
a E GF(C) and for any b E A, for any i, ui(a; C) ;::: ui(b; C) implies ui(a; C) ;::: ui(b; C),
then a E GF(C) .  Take an arbitrary cost profile C E C such that for every surplus­
maximizing allocation X* (F, C) there exists at least one pair (i , j) ,  i E N, j E K
for which xii ( F, C) = 1 and Cij > inf { Cij I Cij E Cij } (under the conditions specified
in the statement above, such C always exists) . Let an alternative a = (X* ,  W*) ,  as 
defined in 46 be in the choice set, (X* , W* ) E GF(C) . Let N1 � N denote the set of 
agents i employed in X* for which there exist a project j (i) such that xij(F, C) = 1 and
Cij > inf{cij l cij E cij} ·  Note that N1 is always non-empty by the assumption of the
proposition. Next, consider another environment C such that Cij = Cij - c if i E N1 and
x;j = 1 ,  for some c > 0 small enough to ensure that Cij E Cij , and cij = cij otherwise.
Then for any b E A, ui(b; C) = ui(b; C) + c Lj Xij(b) if i E N1 and Xij(b) = x;j, and
ui(b; C) = ui(b; C) otherwise; note also that Xij E {O, 1} for all i , j .  Therefore, for any
b E A, any i E N, ui(a; C) ;::: ui(b; C) implies ui(a; C) ;::: ui(b; C) ; then monotonicity
requires that a E GF(C)32 . However, 46 requires that ui(a; C) = 0 if a E GF(C) which 
obviously does not hold. Therefore, a tf. G F( C) and the ·necessary monotonicity condition
is violated under 46. 0 
32Notice that the assumption that X;j E {O ,  1 }  is crucial for the analysis: Suppose that 0 < Xij (a) < 1
for some (i , j ) .  Then consider an alternative b such that Xij (b) = 1 for this ( i , j ) ,  and w;(b) = c;1 - 1:1 , 
where 0 < 1:1 < €. Then u;(a; C) = 0 > u;(b; C). However, u;(a; C) = E * x;1 (a), whereas u;(b; C) = 1:1 . 
Thus, if 1:1 > E * x;3 (a) , we obtain that u;(a; C) < u;(b; C). 
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